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Summary
The concept of data ﬁngerprinting is of paramount importance in the frame-
work of digital content distribution. This project deals with ﬁngerprinting
codes, which are used to prevent dishonest users from redistributing copy-
righted material. After introducing some basic notions of coding and ﬁnger-
printing theory, the project is divided in two parts.
In the ﬁrst part, we present and analyze some of the main existing ﬁn-
gerprinting codes and we also discuss some new constructions. The study is
speciﬁcally focused on the estimation of the minimum length of the codes,
given the design parameters of the system: number of users to allocate, max-
imum size of the collusions and probability of identiﬁcation error. Also, we
present some theoretical results about the new code construction studied.
Finally, we present several simulations, comparing the diﬀerent codes and
estimating what is the minimum-length code in each region.
The second part of the project is devoted to the study of the properties of
Reed-Solomon codes in the context of ﬁngerprinting. Codes with the trace-
ability (TA) property are of remarkable signiﬁcance, since they provide an
eﬃcient way to identify traitors. Codes with the identiﬁable parent property
(IPP) are also capable of identifying traitors, requiring less restrictive condi-
tions than the TA codes at the expense of not having an eﬃcient decoding
algorithm, in the general case. Other codes that have been widely stud-
ied but possess a weaker traitor-tracing capability are the secure frameproof
codes (SFP). It is a well-known result that TA implies IPP and IPP implies
SFP. The converse is in general false. However, it has been conjectured that
for Reed-Solomon codes all three properties are equivalent. In this paper
we investigate this equivalence, and provide a positive answer for families of
Reed-Solomon codes when the number of traitors divide the size of the code
ﬁeld.
Keywords: Fingerprinting, Traitor Tracing, Identiﬁable Parent Prop-
erty, Secure Frameproof Property, Simplex Codes, Boneh-Shaw Codes, Tar-
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This project deals with the study of the parameters and properties of ﬁn-
gerprinting codes, and it is speciﬁcally focused on the length of the codes.
There are many families of such codes, and in this study we have considered
some of the families which have high relevance in this ﬁeld. The project is
organized as follows.
In section 2 we introduce the topic of ﬁngerprinting and deﬁne some useful
notation related to coding theory, ﬁngerprinting and traceability codes. We
also present some basic and well-known results about ﬁngerprinting codes.
Section 3 is devoted to the analysis of the the proposed binary ﬁnger-
printing codes. In this section, we present an analysis of the length of the
Boneh-Shaw codes, some results related to secure frameproof codes and we
propose methods to determine the length of diﬀerent versions of the Barg
codes. Also, a new family of codes, presented in [2], is studied. We con-
clude this section with a comparative analysis between the diﬀerent families
of codes.
In section 4 we study the traceability properties of Reed-Solomon codes.In
2001, Staddon et al. [3] raised a question concerning this topic. Essentially,
one can classify codes according to their capacity to identify dishonest users.
Obviously, codes with “weaker” tracing properties are a subset of codes with
“stronger” tracing properties. The question raised in [3] asks wether, for the
case of Reed-Solomon codes, all these properties are equivalent. We give a




Here we present a summary of the notation that we use in the report of the
project.
Symbol/acronym Description
D(휎∥푝) Kullback-Leibler divergence of two binomial distributions,
D(휎∥푝) = 휎 log2(휎/푝) + (1− 휎) log2((1− 휎)/(1− 푝)).
픽푞 The ﬁnite ﬁeld of 푞 elements.
픽
∗
푞 The multiplicative group of 픽푞.
픽푞[푥] The ring of univariate polynomials over 픽푞.
픽푞[푥]푘 The ring of univariate polynomials over 픽푞 of degree ≤ 푘.
a,b, . . . Vectors over a ﬁnite ﬁeld (boldface).
a(푖) Cyclic rotation in 푖 coordinates to the right of a ∈ 픽푛푞 .
d(a,b) Hamming distance between the vectors a and b.
w(a) Weight of the codeword a.
w퐵(a) Weight of the codeword a restricted to the set of coordinates
in 퐵.
D(퐴,퐵) Group separation between the sets 퐴 and 퐵.
(푛,푀, 푑)푞-code A code of length 푛, size 푀 and minimum distance 푑.
[푛, 푘, 푑]푞-code A linear code of length 푛, dimension 푘 and minimum dis-
tance 푑.
휅 Normalized dimension (rate) of a code: (log푞푀)/푘.
훿 Normalized minimum distance of a code: 푛/푑.
풞표 ∘ 풞푖 Concatenation of the outer code 풞표 with the inner code 풞푖.
풫푞(푛, 푘) Polynomial code of length 푛 and dimension 푘 over 픽푞.
ℛ풮푞(푘) Reed-Solomon code of dimension 푘 over 픽푞.
ℰℛ풮푞(푘) Extended Reed-Solomon code of dimension 푘 over 픽푞.
풜풢푞(푛, 푘, 푑) Algebraic-geometric code approaching the Tsfasman-
Vlaˇdut¸-Zink bound, of length 푛, dimension 푘 and minimum
distance 푑 over 픽푞.
풮푞(푘) Simplex code of dimension 푘 over 픽푞.
ℱ풮(푛표, 푘푖) Binary polynomial simplex concatenated code deﬁned in [4]
(Ferna´ndez-Soriano) with outer code length 푛표 and inner
dimension 푘푖.
ℬ풮(푀, 휖) Binary 푀-secure Boneh-Shaw code with error 휖, of size 푀 .
ℬ풮(푀, 푐, 휖) Binary 푐-secure Boneh-Shaw code with error 휖, of size 푀 .
ℬ풮★(푀, 푐, 휖) Binary 푐-secure concatenated Boneh-Shaw code with error
휖.
ℬ(푀, 푐, 휖) Binary 푐-secure Barg code with error 휖, of size 푀 .
ℬRS(푀, 푐, 휖) Barg code with outer Reed-Solomon code.
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Symbol/acronym Description
ℬRS(푀, 푐, 휖) Barg code with outer algebraic-geometric code.
풞ℱ(푀, 푐, 휖) Binary 푐-secure code deﬁned in [2] (Cotrina-Ferna´ndez) with
error 휖, of size 푀 .
풞ℱRS(푀, 푐, 휖) Code deﬁned in [2] with outer Reed-Solomon code.
풞ℱAG(푀, 푐, 휖) Code deﬁned in [2] with outer algebraic-geometric code.
풯 (푀, 푐, 휖) Binary 푐-secure Tardos code with error 휖, of size 푀 .
SFP Secure frameproof property.
IPP Identiﬁable parent property.
TA Traceability property.
MDS Maximum distance separable (code).
TVZ Tsfasman-Vlaˇdut¸-Zink (bound).
2Preliminaries
Fingerprinting and watermarking are methods to prevent copyright violations
and illegal content redistribution, respectively. Watermarking has been an
eﬀective tool for centuries. For example, in the French Decorations scandal
of 1887, a paper watermark established that two political letters supposedly
written in 1884 were actually written on a paper manufactured in 1885.
Digital watermarking is the process of embedding copyright information
(watermark) into a digital content which is going to be distributed to a
set of users. The content may be audio, pictures or video, for instance.
If the content is copied, then the watermark is also carried in the copy.
Therefore, the legitimate author has a tool to ﬁght against false claims of
authorship. The watermarking process should ideally meet the two following
requirements:
∙ The watermark must be either imperceptible or, if it is not, it must be
non-intrusive.
∙ It must be a robust process, i.e. the watermark must not be easily
made unreadable or deleted.
We shall assume unless otherwise stated that we posses an ideal watermarking
algorithm.
Fingerprinting is also an old cryptographic technique. Several hundred
years ago, distributors of logarithm tables used to introduce tiny errors in
the insigniﬁcant digits of log 푥 for few random values of 푥. Had an owner of
a logarithm table sold illegal copies of it, the errors in the table would have
allowed to identify who was that owner.
In the framework of digital content distribution, illegal redistribution is
a major concern. Therefore, the digital ﬁngerprinting technique appears as
a method to discourage it. In this case, the distributor embeds in the digi-
tal content, using a watermarking algorithm, an unique piece of information
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(ﬁngerprint) for each user. If the content is illegally redistributed, the ﬁn-
gerprint can be extracted and identify the dishonest user. Again, the users
may try to damage the ﬁngerprint before they redistribute the content. This,
however, should not cause much worry to the distributor if the watermarking
process is robust.
Nevertheless, the ﬁngerprinting scenario is prone to another kind of attack
known as collusion attack. As the copies of the content owned by the users
contain diﬀerent ﬁngerprints they are, essentially, diﬀerent objects. Several
users (traitors) may compare their copies and ﬁnd the locations where they
diﬀer. This simple operation reveals where part of the marks are located.
Traitors may generate a new copy of the content where these locations are
deleted or modiﬁed in order not to being caught. This has an additional
and more severe problem: the pirate copy generated by the traitors may
be very similar or coincide with that of an innocent user. Note that the
traitors are unable to detect ﬁngerprint positions where their copies agree.
The distributor, with that amount of information, would like to be able
to identify at least one of the traitors. Therefore, and assuming that we
have robust watermark algorithms, we are interested in the design of sets of
ﬁngerprints (ﬁngerprinting codes) who are resistant against collusion attacks.
2.1 Coding theory deﬁnitions
In this section we present the basic elements of coding theory and ﬁnger-
printing that we will be using throughout the project. This, in turn, allow
us to introduce some notation and conventions.
Given a power of a prime number, 푞, we denote the ﬁnite ﬁeld of 푞 elements
by 픽푞. For any integer 푛 ≥ 1 we denote the elements of 픽푛푞 in boldface,
e.g. a = (푎1, . . . , 푎푛) ∈ 픽푛푞 . As we have just shown, 푎푖 represents the 푖th
coordinate of the vector a. For any subset 퐴 = {a1, a2, . . . } ⊆ 픽푛푞 , we denote
by u(퐴) and m(퐴) the sets of the unmatching and matching coordinates of
the elements of 퐴:
u(퐴) = {푖 : 푎푗,푖 ∕= 푎푘,푖 for some a푗 , a푘 ∈ 퐴}
m(퐴) = {푖 : 푎푗,푖 = 푎푘,푖 for all a푗 , a푘 ∈ 퐴}.
The Hamming distance (or simply, the distance) between a,b ∈ 픽푛푞 is deﬁned
as d(a,b) = ∣ u({a,b})∣, and the similitude between a and b as s(a,b) =
∣m({a,b})∣. It is usual to generalize these two concepts for nonempty subsets
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of vectors 퐴,퐵 ⊆ 픽푛푞 as
d(퐴,퐵) = min{d(a,b) : 푎 ∈ 퐴, 푏 ∈ 퐵}
s(퐴,퐵) = max{s(a,b) : 푎 ∈ 퐴, 푏 ∈ 퐵}.
For the analysis of ﬁngerprinting codes it will also be useful to deﬁne the
following concept related to the distance between codewords.
Deﬁnition 2.1.1. Let 퐴,퐵 be two nonempty subsets of 픽푛푞 , 퐴 = {a1, a2, . . . },
퐵 = {b1,b2, . . . }. We deﬁne the group separation between 퐴 and 퐵,
D(퐴,퐵), as the number of coordinates where the elements of 퐴 and 퐵 have
disjoint elements of 픽푞, that is
D(퐴,퐵) = ∣U(퐴,퐵)∣,
where U(퐴,퐵) = {푖 : {푎1,푖, 푎2,푖, . . . } ∩ {푏1,푖, 푏2,푖, . . . } = ∅} is the group un-
matching set. The coordinates in U(퐴,퐵) are called separated coordinates,
whereas the remaining are called nonseparated coordinates.
One can easily verify that the relations d(퐴,퐵) + s(퐴,퐵) = 푛 and
d(퐴,퐵) ≥ D(퐴,퐵) always hold. Whenever ∣퐴∣ = ∣퐵∣ = 1 the last rela-
tion is satisﬁed with equality.
An (푛,푀, 푑)푞-block code 풞 is a nonempty subset of 픽푛푞 of size 푀 , where
푑 = min{d(a,b) : a,b ∈ 풞, a ∕= b} is called the minimum distance of the
code. We will only deal with block codes, therefore, the adjective block will
be omitted henceforth. We refer to the elements of 풞 as codewords. If 풞 is a
linear 푘-dimensional vector space over 픽푞 we say that 풞 is an [푛, 푘, 푑]푞-code.
Given two integers 푐1 and 푐2, we denote by 퐷푐1,푐2 the smallest of the
D(퐴,퐵) between disjoint sets 퐴,퐵 of an (푛,푀, 푑)푞-code with ∣퐴∣ = 푐1 and
∣퐵∣ = 푐2. Clearly, 퐷1,1 is the minimum distance of the code, 푑. The value
퐷푐1,푐2 is called the (푐1, 푐2)-group separation of the code. For 퐴 and 퐵 disjoint,
we will say that they form a (푐1, 푐2)-nonseparated conﬁguration whenever
they satisfy D(퐴,퐵) = 0.
Finally, we deﬁne the concept of code concatenation, which will be ex-
ploded throughout the project.
Deﬁnition 2.1.2. Given an (푛표,푀, 푑표)푞-code 풞표 (called outer code) and an
(푛푖, 푞, 푑푖)푞푖-code 풞푖 (called inner code) we denote by 풞표∘풞푖 the (푛표푛푖,푀, 푑표푑푖)푞푖-
code 풞 constructed as
풞 = {(휙1(푢1)∥ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ∥휙푛표(푢푛표)) : u = (푢1, . . . , 푢푛표) ∈ 풞표},
where 휙푗 is a bijective mapping 휙푗 : 픽푞 → 풞푖 and ∥ denotes the concatenation
of codewords. We say that 풞 is the concatenated code of 풞표 and 풞푖.
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In other words, to construct a codeword of 풞 = 풞표 ∘ 풞푖, we choose a
codeword of 풞표, u, and for every coordinate 푗 we replace 푢푗 by the value
휙푗(푢푗). The corresponding codeword of 풞 is the concatenation of the 휙푗(푢푗)’s.
It is easy to see that 풞 has length 푛표푛푖, size 푀 and minimum distance 푑표푑푖.
If 풞표 and 풞푖 are [푛표, 푘표, 푑표]푞 and [푛푖, 푘푖, 푑푖]푞푖-codes respectively, the code 풞 has
dimension 푘 = 푘표푘푖.
2.2 Fingerprinting and traceable codes
Assume that a distributor is applying the ﬁngerprinting technique, i.e. the
copies of some content are being watermarked with a ﬁngerprinting code 풞,
and each ﬁngerprint u푖 ∈ 풞 is assigned to a user. We will make no distinction
between users and their corresponding ﬁngerprints. Considering that a set
of 푐 traitors 퐶 = {t1, . . . , t푐} collude and construct a pirate object, we are
interested in the properties of the pirate ﬁngerprint x produced by them.
Deﬁnition 2.2.1. Given an (푛,푀, 푑)푞-ﬁngerprinting code 풞, the envelope
of 퐶 ⊆ 풞, denoted by 픈(퐶), is the set of pirate ﬁngerprints that can be
produced by the codewords in 퐶 in a collusion attack. We denote by 픈푐(풞)
the set of all the pirate ﬁngerprints that can be generated by coalitions of






Obviously, each x ∈ 픈(퐶) must be equal to each t푖 ∈ 퐶 in the set of
matching coordinates, m(퐶). This is known as the marking assumption. For
the coordinates in u(퐶), several models can be deﬁned:
∙ The narrow-sense envelope model: the symbol at each position of the
pirate ﬁngerprint can only be one of the symbols that the traitors have
at that position:
픈(퐶) = {x ∈ 픽푛푞 : 푥푗 ∈ {푡1,푗 , . . . , 푡푐,푗}}.
∙ The wide-sense envelope model: the traitors can put an arbitrary ele-
ment of 픽푞 in the coordinates in u(퐶):
픈(퐶) = {x ∈ 픽푛푞 : 푥푗 = 푡1,푗 for 푗 ∈ m(퐶)}.
∙ The expanded narrow-sense envelope model: the traitors can either put
one of the symbols that the traitors have at that position or make it
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unreadable. This is denoted by ∗, an erasure symbol:
픈(퐶) = {x ∈ (픽푞 ∪ {∗})푛 : 푥푗 = 푡1,푗 for 푗 ∈ m(퐶) and
푥푗 ∈ {∗, 푡1,푗, . . . , 푡푐,푗} for 푗 ∈ u(퐶)}.
∙ The expanded wide-sense envelope model: the traitors can put an ar-
bitrary element of 픽푞 ∪ {∗} in the coordinates in u(퐶):
픈(퐶) = {x ∈ (픽푞 ∪ {∗})푛 : 푥푗 = 푡1,푗 for 푗 ∈ m(퐶)}.
Deﬁnition 2.2.2. Given a ﬁngerprinting code 풞, a 휎-strategy for a set of
traitors, 퐶 ⊆ 풞, is a randomized or deterministic algorithm that takes as
input 퐶 and outputs a pirate codeword x = 휎(퐶) ∈ 픈(퐶)
The presented scenarios are discussed in more detail in [5]. Intuitively,
the wide-sense envelopes lead to more sophisticated 휎-strategies than the
narrow-sense envelopes. The same is valid for non-expanded versus expanded
envelopes. An important remark is that, as we are interested in the case of
digital content distribution, we are interested in ﬁngerprinting codes over 픽2.
In this case the four models are equivalent in terms of traitor tracing. What
is more, for binary codes it is detrimental for the traitors to use ∗, since
it gives the distributor more information that merely inserting 0 or 1 in a
detectable position.
Deﬁnition 2.2.3. Consider the narrow-sense envelope model. Then, an
(푛,푀, 푑)푞-ﬁngerprinting code 풞 may have the following properties:
∙ The code 풞 has the (푐1, 푐2)-secure frameproof property (SFP) if its
group separation satisﬁes 퐷푐1,푐2 > 0. In other words, for any 퐶1, 퐶2 ⊆ 풞
with ∣퐶1∣ = 푐1 and 퐶2 = 푐2 it holds that
퐶1 ∩ 퐶2 = ∅ ⇒ 픈(퐶1) ∩ 픈(퐶2) = ∅.
∙ The code 풞 has the 푐-identiﬁable parent property (IPP) if for any x ∈
픽
푛
푞 either x ∕∈ 픈푐(풞) or the intersection of all the coalitions capable of




∙ The code has the 푐-traceability (TA) property if for any 퐶 ⊆ 풞 with
∣퐶∣ = 푐 and x ∈ 픈(퐶), there exists some t ∈ 퐶 such that d(x, t) <
d(x,y), for any y ∈ 풞 ∖ 퐶.
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The ideas under the previous deﬁnitions are the following. If a code has
the (1, 푐)-SFP property,1 then, no coalition of size at most 푐 will be able to
generate the ﬁngerprint of any user. However, they may generate a pirate
codeword x and claim that it was generated by another 푐-coalition. With an
(푐, 푐)-SFP code [3, 6] they would not be able to accuse a completely disjoint
coalition. Anyways, this does not guarantee that some traitor may be caught.
If the ﬁngerprints belong to a 푐-IPP code [7, 8] then, one can ensure that, at
least, one traitor will be caught: if a codeword belongs to the intersection of
all the coalitions that can generate a pirate codeword, in particular, it belongs
to the coalition that actually generated it. Regarding 푐-TA codes [9, 3], they
oﬀer the same level of security than 푐-IPP codes, with the additional beneﬁt
that some traitor can be identiﬁed eﬃciently, as it is the closest codeword to
x. The following relations are well-known results [3]:
푐-TA⇒ 푐-IPP⇒ (푐, 푐)-SFP. (2.1)
What is more, for any (푛,푀, 푑)푞-code
푑 > 푛(1− 1/푐2)⇒ 푐-TA. (2.2)
Deﬁnition 2.2.4. We say that a ﬁngerprinting code 풞 (under any envelope
model), with identiﬁcation algorithm 휌, is 푐-secure with error 휖 if for any set
of traitors 퐶 ⊆ 풞, with ∣퐶∣ ≤ 푐, using any 휎-strategy the probability that
either no traitor is caught or some innocent user is accused is less than 휖, i.e.
푃 (휌(휎(퐶)) = ∅ ∨ 휌(휎(퐶)) ∩ 풞 ∖ 퐶 ∕= ∅) < 휖.
Note that 푐-IPP and 푐-TA codes can be viewed as 푐-secure ﬁngerprinting
codes with 0 error.2 One may think that they represent the solution to the
ﬁngerprinting problem. However, these codes have two drawbacks: they are
restricted to the narrow-case scenario and the size of the ﬁeld limits severely
their collusion-resistant properties.
Lemma 2.2.5 ([3]). For any (푛,푀, 푑)푞-ﬁngerprinting code with the 푐-IPP
property 푐 < 푞.
As we have commented previously, we are mainly interested in the distri-
bution of digital contents, therefore the codes that we use must be binary.
Unfortunately, the previous lemma states that there are not IPP or TA codes
(i.e. zero-error codes) over 픽2. In the following sections we are devoted to
the study of binary ﬁngerprinting codes with error 휖 > 0. We will show how
concatenated constructions based on TA codes provide interesting tools for
the construction of such codes.
1Codes with the (1, 푐)-SFP property are usually called 푐-frameproof (FP) codes.
2Some authors reserve name of ﬁngerprinting codes solely for (binary) 푐-secure ﬁnger-
printing codes with error 휖. They classify IPP and TA codes as traceable codes.
3Analysis of ﬁngerprinting codes
This part of the project is focused on the study of the main binary ﬁnger-
printing code families existing in the literature. Our goal is to determine or
estimate their length given the following design parameters: the number of
users to allocate in the system, 푀 , the maximum size of the collusions, 푐, and
the allowed identiﬁcation error probability, 휖. For some of the codes the value
of the length follows easily from their deﬁnition. For the others, we propose
methods to estimate it. Also, an analysis and some results related to a new
family of codes are presented. We conclude this part with the simulation
results showing the regions where the codes have minimum length.
3.1 SFP and simplex codes
SFP codes have been introduced in section 2.2. They have been studied
under the name of separating codes in the context of automata: two systems
which transit simultaneously from state 푎 to 푎′ and from 푏 to 푏′ respectively
should be forbidden to pass through a common intermediate state. A state is
described as an 푛-bit array, and transiting from the initial state to the ﬁnal
state can only be done through intermediate states by ﬂipping one bit at a
time, where the current and the ﬁnal states diﬀer.
Recall that with a (푐1, 푐2)-SFP code 풞, a size-푐1 coalition 퐶 ⊆ 풞 cannot
create a pirate codeword which incriminates a disjoint subset of, at most, 푐2
users. We will be mainly interested in SFP codes with 푐1 = 푐2 = 푐. Whenever
푐1 ∕= 푐2 we can obtain a (푐, 푐)-SFP code taking 푐 = min{푐1, 푐2}, provided that
푐 ≥ 2.
SFP codes are not very attractive in a ﬁngerprinting scenario. Given a
size-푐 coalition 퐶 and a pirate codeword x ⊆ 픈(퐶) the only statement that
we can make is that the intersection between sets capable of generating x is
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nonempty. In other words if 퐶 ′ is any size-푐 coalition capable of generating
x, all we can say with certainty is that it contains one true traitor, which
henceforth implies a high false accusation error probability.
Lemma 3.1.1. A (푐, 푐)-SFP code 풞 has an identiﬁcation error probability
휖 < 1− 1/푡.
Proof. Assume that the size-푐 coalition 퐶1 ⊆ 풞 creates the pirate ﬁngerprint
x = 휎(퐶1) ⊆ 픈(퐶1). Now, we propose the following tracing algorithm 휌.
Consider all the size-푐 coalitions 퐶푗 ∈ 풞, 푗 = 1, . . . , 푚 such that x ∈ 픈(퐶푗).
Choose a codeword a which belongs to the maximum number of 퐶푗’s (ties are
broken randomly) and accuse a as a pirate. As a belongs to the maximum
number of 퐶푗’s, say 푖, and because all the 퐶푗 must intersect each other, then,
푚 ≤ 푖+ (푡− 1)(푖− 1). Therefore,
푃 (a ∈ 퐶1) = 푖




which implies 휖 < 1− 1/푡.
Note that a more accurate approximation of the identiﬁcation error prob-
ability in lemma 3.1.1 can be improved after knowing the maximum value
of the intersection in the ﬁrst stage of the proposed decoding method. In [5]
an alternative decoding method is proposed which is somewhat weaker than
this result. There, they construct digital ﬁngerprinting codes based on SFP
codes, where the concatenation of Reed-Solomon and algebraic-geometric
codes strengthen the poor tracing properties of the SFP codes. We will later
discuss such codes.
Besides that, SFP codes present additional drawbacks. Little is known
about how to construct and decode SFP codes, except maybe for the well-
known binary simplex code. What is more, the rate 휅 of binary SFP codes
vanishes dramatically as 푐 increases.
Proposition 3.1.2 ([5]). There exist binary (푐1, 푐2)-SFP codes of size 푀
and length
푛 ≤ (log2푀 + 1)(푐1 + 푐2 − 1)− log2(1− 2−푐1−푐2+1)
,
i.e. of rate
휅 ≥ − log2(1− 2
−(푐1+푐2−1))
푐1 + 푐2 − 1 −
1
푀
≃ − log2(1− 2
−(푐1+푐2−1))
푐1 + 푐2 − 1 . (3.1)
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If 푐1 = 푐2 = 푐, for 푀 ﬁxed and 푐 increasing we have that the length of
SFP codes increases as 푛 = Ω(22푐푐 log푀). The proof of proposition 3.1.2 is
based on an exhaustive search of random codes of size 푛 and, therefore, the
time complexity for generating such a code is 푂(2푀2
2푐푐 log푀). Algorithm 3.1
improves somewhat the running time of the code generation of a binary SFP
code. In this case, the algorithm performs a search over all the possible pairs







subsets. For 푐1 = 푐2 = 푐, the running time of the algorithm is 푂(푀
2푐) at the
expense of having a length of order Ω(푀2푐).
Algorithm 3.1 Simple generation of a binary (푐1, 푐2)-SFP code.
Input: Three integers 푀 ≥ 1, 푐1, 푐2 ≤푀/2.
Output: A binary (푐, 푐)-SFP code 풞 of size 푀 .
푘 ← ⌈log2푀⌉
풞 ← 퐶, where 퐶 ⊆ 픽푘2 and ∣퐶∣ =푀 .
for all 퐴 ⊆ 풞 with ∣퐴∣ = 푐1 do
for all 퐵 ⊆ 풞 ∖ 퐴 with ∣퐵∣ = 푐2 do
if D(퐴,퐵) = 0 then
for all a ∈ 퐴 do
a← a∥(1)
end for







As mentioned before, a notable exception among the SFP codes are the
binary simplex codes. They are deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 3.1.3. The simplex code of parameter 푘 over 픽푞, 풮푞(푘), is the
code which has a generator matrix 퐺 constructed as the concatenation of
푛 = (푞푘 − 1)/(푞 − 1) columns that are pairwise linearly independent vectors
of 픽푘푞 .
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⎝ 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 2
1 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
⎞
⎠ .
Observe that the 푛 required pairwise linearly independent vectors of 픽푘푞 can
always be found, e.g. by choosing all the non-zero vectors with the leftmost
non-zero coordinate equal to 1.
Proposition 3.1.5. The simplex code 풮푞(푘) satisﬁes:
∙ It is an [푛, 푘, 푞푘−1]푞-code, with 푛 = (푞푘 − 1)/(푞 − 1).
∙ It meets the Griesmer bound. Therefore it is a linear code with the
lowest possible length 푛 for a given dimension 푘 and distance 푞푘−1.
∙ It is a constant-weight equidistant code.
∙ It is the dual of a Hamming code.
Now let us focus on the traceability properties of binary simplex codes.
Corollary 3.1.6 ([10]). If 풞 ⊆ 픽푞 is (푐1, 푐2)-SFP, then, max{푐1, 푐2} ≤ 푞.
Corollary 3.1.7 ([10]). All linear, equidistant codes are (2, 2)-SFP.
The two previous corollaries imply that the binary simplex codes are
(2, 2)-SFP, and no better results can be achieved for linear equidistant codes.
Simplex codes present several advantages over generic SFP codes: they are
linear and they need not be stored, there exist polytime decoding algorithms
and, unlike generic (2, 2)-SFP codes, they have a remarkable small iden-
tiﬁcation error probability. Any 2 colluding users of a simplex code can
not generate a pirate codeword at a distance greater than 푑/2 [11]. Note
that this radius is one unit greater than the error-correcting capacity of the
code. Therefore, the appropriate decoding algorithm in this case consists
of performing a list-decoding in a 푑/2 = 2푟−2 radius. Using this decoding
algorithm, we have the following result.
Proposition 3.1.8. According to the 휎-strategy chosen by a set of traitors,
퐶 = {t1, t2} the binary simplex code 풮2(푘), with 푑 = 2푘−1, has the following
identiﬁcation error probability 휖 using a radius-푑/2 list-decoding algorithm:
∙ 휎1-strategy: the pirate ﬁngerprint x is chosen at random from 픈(퐶),
then 휖 ≤ 2푘−푑.
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∙ 휎2-strategy: x is chosen at random from {x푗 : x푗 ∈ 픈(퐶) ∧ d(t1,x) =






∙ 휎3-strategy: x is chosen at random from {x푗 : x푗 ∈ 픈(퐶) ∧ d(t1,x) =






The idea of the proof of proposition 3.1.8 is that on a (2, 2)-SFP code 풞
there are only three possible parent conﬁgurations for any x ∈ 픈(풞). Assume
that 퐶푖, 푖 ≥ 1 are subsets of size 2 of 풞 such that x ∈ 픈(퐶푖). Then, the 퐶푖’s
must form one of the following conﬁgurations:
∙ Star conﬁguration: all the 퐶푖’s intersects in a common element.
∙ Degenerated star conﬁguration: there exists only one 퐶푖.
∙ Triangle conﬁguration: there only exist three 퐶푖 such that 퐶1 = {a,b},
퐶2 = {b, c} and 퐶3 = {c, a}.
One can accuse at least one traitor if the pirate codeword generates a star
or a degenerated star conﬁguration. Therefore 휖 is a bound on the generation
of a triangle conﬁguration. Unfortunately, given any nonzero codewords of
풮2(푘) it is possible to generate deterministically a triangle conﬁguration. This
invalidates the use of simplex codes for ﬁngerprinting. However, it can still
be used as an inner code in a concatenated construction provided that the
resulting code has highly mixed coordinates. A complete discussion of this
issues can be found in [11].
As the simplex code is just parameterized just by its dimension, given
the design parameters 푀, 푐 = 2, 휖, the minimum length of the simplex code,
푂(푀), can be computed as the length of that code with size and identiﬁcation
error probability satisfying the requirements. For 푘 = 30 we can allocate
푀 = 1, 07 ⋅ 109 users and the greatest identiﬁcation error probability of
proposition 3.1 is 휖 ≃ 0, which are reasonable values.
3.2 Polynomial concatenation of simplex codes
In a paper by M. Ferna´ndez and M. Soriano [4] a 2-secure with error 휖
ﬁngerprinting code was presented. It is a binary linear concatenated code
based on simplex codes and it is determined by two parameters, 푛표 and
푘푖, namely, the size of the outer code and the dimension of the inner code,
respectively. First we need the following deﬁnition.
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Deﬁnition 3.2.1. A polynomial code over 픽푞 of parameters 푛 ≤ 푞 and 푘,
풫푞(푛, 푘) is deﬁned as
풫푞(푛, 푘) = {(푓(푝1), . . . , 푓(푝푛) : 푓 ∈ 픽푞[푥]푘−1},
where {푝1, . . . , 푝푛} is a size-푛 set of 픽푞 and 픽푞[푥]푘−1 denotes the ring of the
polynomials over 픽푞 of degree at most 푘 − 1.
Assume that 훼 is a primitive element of 픽푞. When 푛 = 푞− 1 and 푝푖 = 훼푖
for 푖 = 1, . . . , 푛 the code is called Reed-Solomon code, and it is denoted by
ℛ풮푞(푘). If 푛 = 푞 and 푝1 = 0, 푝푖 = 훼푖−1 for 푖 = 2, . . . , 푛 the code is called
extended Reed-Solomon code, and it is denoted by ℰℛ풮푞(푘).
Proposition 3.2.2. The polynomial code satisfes:
∙ It is linear, of length 푛 and dimension 푘.
∙ It has minimum distance 푑 = 푛−푘+1 and, hence, it meets the Singleton
bound.
∙ Reed-Solomon codes are cyclic.
Now, we are in position to deﬁne the concatenated construction.
Deﬁnition 3.2.3. Given two integer values 푛표, 푘푖 with 2
푘푖 ≤ 푛표, the con-
catenated code1 ℱ풮(푛표, 푘푖) over 픽2 is deﬁned as the concatenation of the
polynomial code 풫2푘푖 (푛표, ⌈푛표/4⌉) and the binary simplex code 풮2(푘푖),
ℱ풮(푛표, 푘푖) = 풫(푛표, ⌈푛표/4⌉)2푘푖 ∘ 풮2(푘푖).
To determine the identiﬁcation error probability, we need to present be-
fore the decoding algorithm. It is as follows. The outer code used here is
2-TA, because it satisﬁes (2.2), and therefore the tracing capacity is limited
by the inner code. After decoding the 푗th subcodeword, we will have a set
of 1, 2 or 3 codewords2 of the simplex code. As a result, and after applying
the inverse mapping 휙−1푗 , we will obtain a subset 푆푗 ⊂ 픽2푘푖 containing up
to 3 elements. For 푝 = 1, 2, 3, we denote by 푆(푝) the set of the 푆푗 ’s with
∣푆푗∣ = 푝. Obviously ∣푆(1)∣ + ∣푆(2)∣ + ∣푆(3)∣ = 푛표. Next, we construct the
following 2푘푖 × 푛표 reliability matrix Π = (휋푖,푗), where
휋푖,푗 =
{
1/∣푆푗∣ if 훼푖 ∈ 푆푗
0 otherwise.
1Note that when 풫(푛표, ⌈푛표/4⌉) is a Reed-Solomon code, then ℱ풮(푛표, 푘푖) is determined
by a single parameter.
2One codeword if the coalition produced a star conﬁguration, two if it produced a
degenerated star and three if it produced a triangle conﬁguration in that subcodword.
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Here 훼푖 denotes the 푖th element of the outer ﬁeld, according to an arbitrary
preestablished order. The matrix Π is used as the input for the Koetter-Vardy
soft-decision decoding algorithm [12]. This decoding algorithm returns all the
codewords u ∈ 풫(푛표, ⌈푛표/4⌉) that satisfy
⟨Π, [u]⟩√⟨Π,Π⟩ ≥
√
푘표 − 1 + 표(1),
where ⟨⋅, ⋅⟩ denotes the inner product. For the complete details of the rela-
tions between the Koetter-Vardy decoding algorithm and the tracing algo-
rithm of ℱ풮(푛표, 푘푖), see [4, 11].
Because the outer code is 2-TA, observe that:
1. If ∣푆(1)∣+∣푆(2)∣ > 4(푛표−푑표), then, at least one of the traitors is identiﬁed
with probability 1.
2. If ∣푆(2)∣ > 2(푛표−푑표), then, both traitors are identiﬁed with probability
1.
3. If ∣푆(1)∣ + ∣푆(2)∣ <= 4(푛표 − 푑표), then, the only cases of identiﬁcation
are:
(a) if there exists a 푗 such that there is a 푆푗 = {훼1, 훼2} ∈ 푆(2) and
there exist exactly 2 codewords u1,u2 ∈ 푈 such that 푢1,푗 = 훼1
and 푢2,푗 = 훼2, output u1,u2 as traitors,
(b) if there exists a 푗 such that there is a 푆푗 = {훼} ∈ 푆(1) and there
exists exactly 1 codeword u ∈ 푈 such that 푢푗 = 훼, output u as a
traitor.
Therefore the tracing capacity of the algorithm is limited by the capacity
of the traitors to generate triangle conﬁgurations in the subcodewords of
ℱ풮(푛표, 푘푖). Taking this into account, the tracing algorithm can only fail if
∣푆(3)∣ ≥ 푛표 − 2(푛표 − 푑표).
Given the identiﬁcation error probability of the inner code, 휖푖, we deﬁne
푃 as








No codeword will be identiﬁed if there is a codeword in the outer code that
matches all the parent positions in 푆(1)∪푆(2). The outer code is a polynomial












휖 ≤ 2푘푖푘표 ⋅ 푃. (3.2)
18 3. Analysis of ﬁngerprinting codes
The original algorithm, however, can be somewhat improved. Assume
that 푈 is the set of codewords returned by the Koetter-Vardy algorithm.
The idea is that if we can ensure that {a,b} ⊆ 푈 and we apply a process
giving as a result a subset 푈 ′ ⊆ 푈 ensuring that no traitor will be removed,
then if ∣푈 ′∣ = 2, we can output 푈 ′ as a positive parent set. An important
remark is that the position of the coordinates of every codeword in ℱ풮(푛표, 푘푖)
need to be shuﬄed (and unshuﬄed before decoding) to prevent systematic
attacks on the simplex code. For a complete discussion of the code, see [4, 11].
Since ℱ풮(푛표, 푘푖) depends on two parameters, given the design parameters
푀, 푐 = 2, 휖, one can perform a search over some pairs of parameters and use
the shortest code which satisﬁes them considering 푀 ≤ 2푘푖⌈푛표/4⌉ and (3.2).
For 푘표 = 6 and 푛표 = 64 we obtain a code of size 푀 = 1, 0995 ⋅ 1012, length
푛 = 992 and identiﬁcation error probability 휖 ≤ 1, 0421 ⋅ 10−66, so it is
expected that one can ﬁnd the required code for reasonable values of the
design parameters.
3.3 The Boneh-Shaw codes
In [13] a family of binary 푀-secure with error 휖 codes were introduced by
D. Boneh and J. Shaw. They construct the ℬ풮(푀, 푑) for 푀 users using a
matrix that has 푀 − 1 column types repeated 푑 times each. The codewords
are then the rows the matrix.
Example 3.3.1. The ℬ풮(푀, 푑) for 푀 = 8 users is
User 1 u1 = (
퐵1︷ ︸︸ ︷
1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅1
퐵2︷ ︸︸ ︷
1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅1
퐵3︷ ︸︸ ︷
1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅1
퐵4︷ ︸︸ ︷
1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅1
퐵5︷ ︸︸ ︷
1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅1
퐵6︷ ︸︸ ︷
1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅1
퐵7︷ ︸︸ ︷
1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅1)
User 2 u2 = (0 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅0 1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅1 1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅1 1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅1 1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅1 1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅1 1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅1)
User 3 u3 = (0 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅0 0 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅0 1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅1 1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅1 1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅1 1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅1 1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅1)
User 4 u4 = (0 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅0 0 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅0 0 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅0 1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅1 1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅1 1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅1 1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅1)
User 5 u5 = (0 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅0 0 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅0 0 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅0 0 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅0 1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅1 1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅1 1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅1)
User 6 u6 = (0 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅0 0 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅0 0 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅0 0 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅0 0 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅0 1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅1 1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅1)
User 7 u7 = (0 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅0 0 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅0 0 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅0 0 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅0 0 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅0 0 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅0 1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅1)
User 8 u8 = (0 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅0 0 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅0 0 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅0 0 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅0 0 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅0 0 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅0 0 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅0)
Note that every set of 푑 coordinates, 퐵1, . . .퐵푀−1, contains only one column
type repeated 푑 times.
Proposition 3.3.2 ([13]). The ℬ풮(푀, 푑) code satisﬁes that
∙ It is a binary (푛,푀, 푑)-code with 푛 = (푀 − 1)푑.
∙ If 푑 ≥ 2푀2 log(2푀/휖) it is an푀-secure ﬁngerprinting code with 휖 error.
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The security of the code lies on the uniqueness of the boundaries between
0’s and 1’s for every user. If user 푖 is not guilty, then, even though the rest
of the users collude to generate a pirate codeword x they will not be able
to distinguish between column types 푖 and 푖 − 1. Therefore, x will have
approximately the same distribution of symbols in these the 퐵푖−1 ∪퐵푖. This
requires, however, that the columns of the codebook are heavily mixed before
insert the ﬁngerprints in the content. Algorithm 3.2 describes the original
tracing algorithm proposed in [13].
Algorithm 3.2 Tracing algorithm for the ℬ풮(푀, 푑) code.
Input: The ℬ풮(푀, 푑) code with 푑 ≥ 2푀2 log(2푀/휖) and a pirate codeword
x generated by any coalition of traitors.
Output: A list of traitors capable of generating the codeword x with iden-
tiﬁcation error probability 휖, according to proposition 3.3.2.
퐶 ← ∅
if w퐵1(x) > 0 then
퐶 ← 퐶 ∪ {u1}
end if
if w퐵푀−1(x) < 푑 then
퐶 ← 퐶 ∪ {u푀}
end if
for all 푖 = 2, . . . ,푀 − 1 do
















However, the ℬ풮(푀, 푑) code has the drawback that its length grows as
푂(푀3 log(푀/휖))), which is not desirable. The cubic growth is due to the
fact that the code is designed to ﬁght against maximal coalition sizes. To
overcome this problem, under the relations pointed in [14], the following
construction is proposed to achieve 푐-secure codes of logarithmic length, 푛 =
푐푂(1) log푀 . The idea is to concatenate codes, using as the inner code 풞푖 the
푀-secure code ℬ풮(푀푖, 푑푖) and as the outer code 풞표 a random (푛표,푀표, 푑표)-
code over an alphabet of size 푀푖. The resulting code ℬ풮★(푛표,푀표,푀푖, 푑푖) has
size 푀 = 푀표 and length 푛 = 푛표푑푖(푀푖 − 1).
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Theorem 3.3.3 ([13]). Given integers 푀표, 푐 and 휖 > 0, set the following
values:
∙ 푀푖 = 2푐,
∙ 푛표 = 2푐 log(2푀표/휖),
∙ 푑푖 = 2푀2푖 log(2푀푖푛표/휖).
Then, the code ℬ풮★(푛표,푀표,푀푖, 푑푖) is a 푐-secure ﬁngerprinting code with 휖,
size 푀 = 푀표 and length 푛 = 푂(푛표푑푖푀푖),
푛 = 푂(푐4 log(푀/휖) log(1/휖). (3.3)
An important issue of the ℬ풮★(푛표,푀표,푀푖, 푑푖) code is that for reasonable
values of 휖 the number of codewords is asymptotically exp(푂(
√
푛)). This can




푐8 log2푀 + 4푐4푛
2푐4
.
As log 휖 < 0, we discard the positive root. Now, taking log푀 = 푂(푛훼) and
substituting it into the previous equation we have that for every value of 푐
log 휖 = 푂(푛훼 −
√
푛+ 푛2훼).
If we take 훼 < 1/2, then,
log 휖 = 푂(−√푛). (3.4)
For 훼 ≥ 1/2 we rewrite (3.3) and, because log 휖≪ 푛훼, we obtain
푛 = 푂(푐4(log 휖− 푛훼) log 휖) = 푂(−푛훼 log 휖).
This implies that log 휖 = Ω(−푛1−훼). Combining this with (3.4) we have that
log 휖 = −Ω(min{√푛, 푛1−훼}).
In other words, 휖 cannot decrease faster than exp(−Ω(√푛)), so we take 훼 =
1/2 and henceforth 푀 = exp(푂(
√
푛)).
Another alternative based on the Boneh-Shaw codes focused in reducing
the size of the ﬁngerprinting code is that presented in [15]. There, a new
analysis of the ℬ풮(푀, 푑) code is presented, which leads to the following
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Algorithm 3.3 Tracing algorithm for the modiﬁed ℬ풮(푀, 푑) code.
Input: The ℬ풮(푀, 푑) code with 푑 ≥ 8(푐+√푐+ 1)2 log(4푀/휖) and a pirate
codeword x generated by any coalition of traitors of size at most 푐.
Output: A list of traitors capable of generating the codeword x with iden-
tiﬁcation error probability 휖, according to theorem 3.3.4.
퐶 ← ∅
if w퐵1(x) > 0 then
퐶 ← 퐶 ∪ {u1}
end if
if w퐵푀−1(x) < 푑 then









for all 푖 = 2, . . . ,푀 − 1 do
if w푅푖(x)− w푅푖−1(x) > 2휆 then




Theorem 3.3.4 ([15]). The ℬ풮(푀, 푑) code with
푑 ≥ 8(푐+√푐+ 1)2 log(4푀/휖)
that is, of length 푂(푀푐2 log(푀/휖)), is a binary 푐-secure ﬁngerprinting code
with error 휖.
Applying similar decoding rules as the ones used in [13], Algorithm 3.3
performs the decoding of the redesigned code.
Given the design parameters푀, 푐 and 휖, we denote by ℬ풮(푀, 휖), ℬ풮∗(푀, 푐, 휖),
ℬ풮(푀, 푐, 휖) the 푐-secure with error 휖 version of the Boneh-Shaw codes pre-
sented in this section, with lengths described in proposition 3.3.2, theorem
3.3.3 and theorem 3.3.4, respectively. Note that for the ﬁrst code, 푐 =푀 .
3.4 The Barg codes
In [5] A. Barg, G. R. Blakley and G. A. Kabatiansky present a family of
digital ﬁngerprinting codes based on (푐, 푐)-SFP codes. As well as in the
case of the Boneh-Shaw codes, the idea underneath the Barg codes relies on
concatenation.
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Deﬁnition 3.4.1. Let 풞표 be linear [푛표, 푘표, 푑표 = 훿표푛표]푞-code with




푐(푞 − 1) ,
and 풞푖 be a size-푞 code with the (푐, 푐)-SFP property. The Barg code ℬ(푞, 푛표, 푘표)
is deﬁned as the concatenated code 풞표 ∘ 풞푖.
Theorem 3.4.2 ([5]). The code ℬ(푞, 푛표, 푘표) using 풞푖 as the inner code and
풞표 as the outer code is a 푐-secure ﬁngerprinting code of length 푛 = 푛표푛푖 with
푀 = 푞푘표 codewords and identiﬁcation error probability
휖 ≤ 2−푛휅푖((log2 푞)−1D(휎∥ 푐−1푞−1 )−휅표). (3.5)
Here 휎 = 1/푐 − (1 − 훿표)푐 and 휅표 = 푘표/푛표, 휅푖 = 푘푖/푛푖 are the rate of the
outer and the inner code, respectively and D(휎∥푝) is the Kullback-Leibler
divergence, D(휎∥휖) = 휎 log2(휎/휖) + (1− 휎) log2((1− 휎)/(1− 휖)).
In order to guarantee security against size-푐 coalitions, the mappings used
in the concatenation, 휙푖 : 픽푞 → 풞푖, for 푖 = 1, . . . , 푛표, must be chosen at
random. We now show the two purposed implementations and how their
length can be computed.
3.4.1 Reed-Solomon codes as outer codes
The ﬁrst construction is based on extended Reed-Solomon codes over a large
alphabet. Take as inner code 풞푖 a (푐, 푐)-SFP code of size 푞 and rate 휅푖. Next,
choose an extended Reed-Solomon code ℰℛ풮푞(푘표) as outer code 풞표. Now
























= 휎(log2 휎 + log2(푞 − 1) + log2(푡− 1)) ≈ 휎 log2 푞. (3.6)
As ℰℛ풮푞(푘표) meets the Singleton bound, and because 푞 is large, its rate and
normalized minimum distance satisfy
1− 훿표 = 휅표 + 표(1).
This, together with (3.6), implies that the identiﬁcation error probability of
(3.5) can be approximated by
휖 ≤ 2−푛(푐−1휅푖−(푐+1)휅+표(1)), (3.7)
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where 휅 = 휅푖휅표 denotes the rate of the concatenated code. The code will
exist provided that the exponent in the previous equation is negative, that





Now, let us estimate the code length of the previous construction given
the design parameters 푀, 푐, 휖. First, note that the rate of the inner code 휅푖
can be computed according to (3.1), hence, it does not depend on 푀 nor 휖.
Ignoring the term 표(1)3 in (3.7) and combining (3.8) with푀 = 2푛휅 we obtain
log2푀
푛
≤ 휅 < 휅푖
푐(푐 + 1)
.
From (3.7) we obtain
푛 ≥ − log2 휖
휅푖/푐− (푐+ 1)휅,
and therefore an estimation of the minimum length of the code ℰℛ풮푞(푘푖)∘풞푖
for SFP inner codes, according to (3.1), is
푛 ≥ 2푐(푐− 1)− log2 휖+ (푐+ 1) log2푀− log2(1− 2−(2푐−1))
. (3.9)
That is, the code has a length of order Ω(max{22푐푐2 log 1
휖
, 22푐푐3 log푀}).
3.4.2 Algebraic-geometric codes as outer codes
The second construction is based on outer algebraic-geometric codes ap-
proaching the Tsfasman-Vlaˇdut¸-Zink (TVZ) bound. It is well-known [16]
the existence of families of [푛표, 푘표, 푑표]푞 algebraic-geometric codes over a ﬁnite
ﬁeld 픽푞 whose parameters asymptotically approach the bound
푘표 + 푑표 ≥ 푛표 − 푛표/(√푞 − 1), (3.10)





















푞 − 1 .
3This term is actually 1/푞.
24 3. Analysis of ﬁngerprinting codes





푐(푞 − 1) +
1√
푞 − 1 . (3.11)
The value 퐴 is always positive. This is implied by the fact that 푐−1+푐2√푞+
푞 > 0, which is a trivial condition. Another necessary condition to guarantee
the existence of the code, according to (3.5), is 푓(휅표) > 0, where









)∥∥∥∥ 푐− 1푞 − 1
)
− 푥.
It is easy to see that 푓(푥) is a monotonically decreasing function of 푥 with
a root, namely 휅max표 , in the interval 0 < 푥 < 퐴. The code will exists for any
휅표 < 휅
max
표 . We omit here the proof because a similar proof will be presented
later.
Now, let us compute the length of the Barg code when using an outer
algebraic-geometric code. Given the same design parameters, 푀, 푐 and 휖,
and a set of possible values for 푞, we proceed as follows.
1. Compute 휅푖, which only depends on 푐.
2. For a given value of 푞:
(a) Compute the value 퐴(푞) according to (3.11).
(b) Find the value 휅max표 performing a search in the interval 0 < 휅
max
표 <
퐴(푞). This can be done numerically.
(c) For every 0 < 휅표 < 휅
max
표 compute 푛(휅표, 푞) = max{푛1, 푛2}, where
푛1 = log2(푀)/(휅푖휅표)
푛2 = − log2(휖)/(휅푖((log2 푞)−1D(휎∥ 푐−1푞−1)− 휅표)).
This ensures that the code meets the requirements. Compute the
value 푛(푞) = min{푛(휅표, 푞) : 0 < 휅표 < 퐴(푞)}.
3. Repeat the procedure until all the plausible values of 푞 have been tested
and return 푛, the minimum value of the 푛(푞)’s, as the code length.
Note that, the value 푛(휅표, 푞) is the minimum length such that both
the code size and the identiﬁcation error probability satisfy the require-
ments. Therefore, the procedure consists in ﬁnding the minimum value of
the 푛(휅표, 푞)’s.
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Figure 3.1: Plot of the length of ℬAG(푀, 푐, 휖, 푞) versus 휅표
As an example, in ﬁgure 3.1 there is a plot of 푛(휅표, 푞) for 푀 = 10
6, 푐 =
5, 휖 = 10−15 and 푞 = 500. The minimum length occurs approximately at
0.038 and the minimum achieved code length is 푛 = 1.6834 ⋅ 106. We denote
by ℬRS(푀, 푐, 휖) and ℬAG(푀, 푐, 휖) the 푐-secure with error 휖 Barg codes of size
푀 , for outer extended Reed-Solomon and algebraic-geometric codes. The
decoding of the Barg codes is performed in a two step-process: ﬁrst, decod-
ing the inner codes and then, using the list-decoding Guruswami-Sudan [17]
decoding algorithm. The algorithm based in a similar idea to that presented
for the polynomial concatenated simplex codes.
3.5 The Tardos codes
The original Tardos code was presented in [18]. Currently it is the code
with the best-known asymptotic length. In fact, the Tardos code mets the
following bound.
Proposition 3.5.1 ([18]). Any (푛,푀, 푑) 푐-secure code with error 휖 satisﬁes
푛 = Ω(푐2 log(1/휖)).
Deﬁnition 3.5.2. Let 푀, 푐 be positive integers with 푐 ≤ 푀 and 0 < 휖 < 1.
The Tardos code of parameters푀, 푐, 휖, 풯 (푀, 푐, 휖), is a 푐-secure ﬁngerprinting
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code with error 휖 and length 푛 = 100푐2⌈log(푀/휖)⌉, where every codeword
u = (푢1, . . . , 푢푛) ∈ 풯 (푀, 푐, 휖) is such that 푃 (푢푖 = 1) = 푝푖, and every 푝푖, 1 ≤




휋 − 4 arcsin(√푐)
1√




In the original paper, it is set a value of 퐿 = 100 as a multiplicative
constant term in the length of the code. However, many researchers found
this constant not accurate. Better known approximations are, for instance,
퐿 = 4휋2 [19], 퐿 = 38 [20]. Other works propose more practical implementa-
tions of the Tardos code [21].
Because of its random nature, the decoding of the Tardos code is almost
a “brute force” process, i.e. the code must perform a search over all the
codewords in 풯 (푀, 푐, 휖). Algorithm 3.4 is the decoding algorithm for this
code.
Algorithm 3.4 Tracing algorithm for the 풯 (푀, 푐, 휖) code.
Input: The 풯 (푀, 푐, 휖) code and a pirate codeword x generated by any coali-
tion of traitors.
Output: A list of traitors capable of generating the codeword x with iden-
tiﬁcation error probability 휖.
Arrange the 푀 codewords u1, . . . ,u푀 in an 푀 × 푛 matrix where the 푗th
row is the codeword u푗 .











1−푝푖 if 푢푗,푖 = 0.
푍 ← 20푐⌈log(푀/휖)⌉
퐶 ← ∅
for all u푖 ∈ 풯 (푀, 푐, 휖) do
if
∑푛
푖=1 푥푖푈푗,푖 > 푍 then
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3.6 Structured concatenation of ﬁngerprint-
ing codes
We have already discussed in previous sections constructions based on con-
catenation. Here we discuss a new family of codes proposed by J. Cotrina
and M. Ferna´ndez in [2].
As mentioned earlier, TA codes and 푐-IPP codes can be viewed (under the
narrow-case model) as 푐-secure ﬁngerprinting codes with null error. What is
more, TA codes posses and eﬃcient decoding algorithm. Recall from (2.2)
that a code with
푑 > 푛(1− 1/푐2) (3.12)
is 푐-TA (and hence, 푐-IPP). Therefore, one may try to ﬁnd a binary code
satisfying (2.2). Unfortunately, for the binary case, we have that not only
such codes do not exist, but no binary IPP code do exists.
Corollary 3.6.1. Any (푛,푀, 푑)푞-code 풞 over 픽푞 with 푑 > 푛(1−1/푐2) satisﬁes
that 푐 < 푞.
Proof. The proof is immediate, since 푑 > 푛(1 − 1/푐2) ⇒ 푐-TA ⇒ 푐-IPP ⇒
푐 < 푞, where the last assertion is due to lemma 2.2.5.
As commented earlier, the ﬁeld size limits considerably the traceability
properties in the narrow-case scenario. Therefore concatenated outer TA
codes with inner binary codes cannot be used for our purposes. The idea
proposed in [2] consists of concatenating an outer 푐-TA code 풞표 satisfying
(3.12) with an inner binary 푐-secure ﬁngerprinting code with error 휖. Obvi-
ously, after decoding the inner code, we will have an average of 푛표휖푖 errors in
the outer code, and the selected value of 푑표 may not be higher enough. The
solution to this problem consists of adding an additional term that depends
on 휖푖 to the value of 푑표 in (3.12).
Theorem 3.6.2 ([2]). Let 풞표 be an (푛표,푀, 푑표)푞-code. Let 풞푖 be an (푛푖, 푞, 푑푖)-
binary 푐-secure ﬁngerprinting code with 휖푖 error. Then, for any 휖푖 < 휎 <
1/(푐 + 1), the concatenated code 풞 = 풞표 ∘ 풞푖 is a binary 푐-secure ﬁnger-
printing code with exponentially decreasing identiﬁcation error probability
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The proof of the theorem, as well as in the case of the Barg codes, is








where 휉푖 are independent Bernoully random variables equal to 1 with prob-
ability 휖푖 and 0 with probability 1 − 휖푖. Using this result, the identiﬁcation
error probability of the concatenated code can be bounded by
휖 ≤ 2−푛표D(휎∥휖푖) (3.14)
In order to obtain a short ﬁngerprinting code and to provide an eﬃcient
decoding algorithm, the two purposed outer codes are based, as in the case
of the Barg codes, in Reed-Solomon codes and algebraic-geometric codes
approaching the TVZ bound. As inner codes, Boneh-Shaw codes ℬ풮(푞, 푐, 휖)
are proposed. Given the design parameters, we denote by 풞ℱRS(푀, 푐, 휖)
and 풞ℱAG(푀, 푐, 휖) the concatenated codes, when using Reed-Solomon and
algebraic-geometric as outer codes, respectively.
3.6.1 Reed-Solomon codes as outer codes
Our goal is to choose the optimal parameters to construct a minimum-length
concatenated code 풞ℱRS(푀, 푐, 휖) = ℛ풮푞(푘표)∘풞푖, given a ﬁxed family of inner
codes 풞푖. We choose as 풞표 a Reed-Solomon code over 픽푞, where 푞 is the size
of the inner code.
Deﬁnition 3.6.3. For a ﬁxed value of 0 < 휎 < 1/(푐 + 1), we denote by
풞ℱRS(푀, 푐, 휖, 휎) the 푐-secure ﬁngerprinting code with error 휖 for 푀 users
constructed according to the following steps:
1. Find the minimum prime power 푞 such that 푓(푞) > 0, where
푓(푞) = 푀 − 푞⌈(푞−1)( 1−휎(푐+1)푐2 )⌉.
2. Find the 0 < 휖푖 < 휎 such that 푔(휖푖) = 0, where
푔(휖푖) = 푞D(휎∥휖푖)− log2 휖.
3. Construct 풞ℱRS(푀, 푐, 휖, 휎) as ℛ풮푞(푘표) ∘ 풞푖, where ℛ풮푞(푘표) is a Reed-









and 풞푖 is a binary 푐-secure ﬁngerprinting code with error 휖푖 and size 푞.
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Lemma 3.6.4. Assume that the length of the inner code of 풞ℱRS(푀, 푐, 휖, 휎),
풞푖, is a monotonically decreasing function of 휖푖. Then, 풞ℱRS(푀, 푐, 휖, 휎) exists
and it is the shortest 푐-secure ﬁngerprinting code with error 휖 of size푀 among
all the codes of the form ℛ풮푞(푘표)∘풞푖 for a ﬁxed 휎 and a ﬁxed family of codes
풞푖.
Proof. First, note that 풞ℱRS(푀, 푐, 휖, 휎) has size, at least, 푀 if the ℛ풮푞(푘표)
code has 푞푘표 ≥푀 codewords. In order to satisfy (3.13) we take








which is the minimum value allowed for 푑표, leading to the maximum dimen-
sion. Therefore, 푀−푞푘표 > 0 is precisely the condition that 푓(푞) must satisfy
in the ﬁrst step. As 푓(푞) is a monotonically increasing function of 푞 we can
ﬁnd the smallest value for which 푓(푞) > 0. Next, the code must satisfy
(3.14). For 휎 ﬁxed, D(휎∥휖푖) is a monotonically decreasing function of 휖푖,in
the interval (0, 휎), from +∞ to 0. Therefore, there exists some value for 휖푖,
say 휖′푖 such that 푔(휖
′
푖) = 0. Since we assume that the length of 풞푖 decreases
with 휖푖, we choose the maximum value allowed for 휖푖 = 휖
′
푖, which leads to the
minimum-length code 풞ℱRS(푀, 푐, 휖, 휎).
We are, however, interested in the shortest-length 풞ℱRS(푀, 푐, 휖, 휎) code
for any value of 0 < 휎 < 1/(푐 + 1). Therefore, we must perform a search in
that interval.
As an example, in the ﬁgure 3.2 we have considered the following param-
eters: 푀 = 106, 푐 = 20 and 휖 = 10−3. It can be appreciated that for these
parameters the optimal code occurs for 휎 = 0.0037, approximately.
As the equations involved in the computation of the length are tran-
scendental, the only way to determine the optimal value for 휎 is through
numerical simulation. We denote by 풞ℱRS(푀, 푐, 휖) the optimal code.
3.6.2 Algebraic-geometric codes as outer codes
Finally we present another construction which is asymptotically optimal.
The implementation consists of the concatenation of an outer algebraic-
geometric code with an inner ﬁngerprinting code. Recall that there exist
codes approaching the TVZ bound (3.10):
푘표 + 푑표 ≥ 푛표 − 푛표/(√푞 − 1).
These codes satisfy 푛표 = 푂(log(푀)). Let 풜풢푞(푛표, 푘표, 푑표) be one of those
codes satisfying (3.13). Since we are interested in positive-rate algebraic-
geometric codes, i.e. 푘표/푛표 > 0, for 푑표, we have that it must be an integer
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Figure 3.2: Plot of the length of 풞ℱ(푀, 푐, 휖, 휎) versus 휎
value satisfying the TVZ bound and (3.13):
푛표
(
1− 1− 휎(푐+ 1)
푐2
)






Thus, a suﬃcient condition for the existence of such value is
푛표
(









Solving for 푞, we obtain
√
푞 > 1 +
푐2
1− 푐2/푛표 − (1 + 푐)휎 . (3.16)
Note that 푛표 is related to the design parameter 휖, because of (3.14), as
푛표 ≥ log2 휖푖
D(휎∥휖푖) .
Therefore, we have the following necessary lemma to guarantee the existence
of the concatenated code 풞ℱAG(푀, 푐, 휖).
Lemma 3.6.5. The code 풞 = 풜풢푞(푛표, 푘표, 푑표) ∘ 풞푖 exists if 휖푖 < 휎 < 휎′ <
1/(푐+ 1), where 휎′ is the root of the equation
ℎ(휎) = 1 +
푐2퐷(휎∥휖푖)
log2 휖
− (1 + 푐)휎
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in the interval 휖푖 < 휎 < 1/(푐+ 1).
Proof. One can easily see that ℎ(휎) contains a root in the interval 휖푖 <
휎 < 1/(푐 + 1). First, note that in that interval ℎ′(휎) = (1 + 푐)휎 − 1 is a
negative increasing function that reaches zero for 휎 = 1/(푐+1), and ℎ′′(휎) =
푐2퐷(휎∥휖푖)/log2 휖 is a negative decreasing function starting at 0. Therefore,
it must exist a single value 휎′ where both functions meet (See ﬁgure 3.3 for
a numerical example). Since ℎ(휎) = ℎ′′(휎) − ℎ′(휎), it changes sign at 휎′.
Considering (3.14) we have that 푛표 ≥ 푐2퐷(휎∥휖푖)/log2 휖, and therefore, the
only interval where we can ensure the existence of the code is 휖 < 휎 < 휎′,
otherwise
√
푞 would not be a positive number. Obviously, as 푛표 increases,
휎′ → 1/(푐+ 1).








Figure 3.3: Plot of ℎ′(휎) and ℎ′′(휎) for 푐 = 20, 휖푖 = 10
−2 and 휖 = 10−3
Asymptotically, we can suppress the term 푐2/푛표 from (3.16), which implies
that constructible codes exist if 휖푖 < 휎 < 1/(푐+ 1), with 푞 = Ω(푐
4). In order
to obtain an eﬃcient decoding process, in [2] it is suggested to use, as inner
codes, binary 푐-secure Barg codes, which have been presented previously. In




Finally, we make some considerations about the decoding process. The
inner decoding algorithm is obviously algorithm 3.3. For the outer decoding,
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as in the case of the Barg codes, the Guruswami-Sudan algorithm [17] is
used, which is a polynomial-complexity process. This algorithm will return




If the inner code were error-free, we would only need that the outer code had
푑표 > 푛표 − 푛표/푐2 (which would imply that it is a TA code). In this case, all
the codewords in the output list would be traitors. In [2] it is shown that
if x is a pirate codeword and u an innocent user of the code 풞ℱAG(푀, 푐, 휖),
after the inner decoding and with probability error 휖, it is satisﬁed that
d(u,x) ≥ 푛표 − 푛표휎 − 푐(푛표 − 푑표) > 푛표 − 푛표(1− 휎)
푐
Therefore, if we only want traitors in the output list, the outer code must
satisfy





























This equation, together with (3.15) are the restriction of the parameters for
the case of algebraic-geometric codes. After solving the system of restrictions
computationally, ensuring that there exists an integer value 푑표 for which both
conditions holds, leads to the following restrictions:
0 < 휎 ≤ 1
(푐+ 1)
≤ 1/2,











1− 8푐휎 + 4휎2 + 20푐2휎2 − 24푐휎3 − 16푐3휎3 + 4휎4 + 32푐2휎4 − 16푐휎5
휎8
Therefore, it is possible to ensure that the output list only contains
traitors for suﬃciently large values of 푞. This however has only theoreti-
cal interest in the asymptotic case. In any case, it is possible to identify a
traitor, because with probability error 휖, it is the closest codeword to the
pirate ﬁngerprint in the list returned by the Guruswami-Sudan algorithm.
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3.7 Simulation results
We present in this section the simulation results. Our goal is to determine the
code with the minimum length given the design parameters 푀, 푐 and 휖. As
we are interested in practical implementations, we will often establish a limit
around 107 108 users. The graphics show the regions of the shortest-length
code.
The ﬁrst simulations are focused on the diﬀerent versions of the Boneh-
Shaw codes: the two original constructions and the one proposed in [15].
Figure 3.4 shows the results of the simulation for these families with a ﬁxed
identiﬁcation error probability 휖 = 10−10. For large values of 푀 , the (ran-
dom) concatenated version of the code, ℬ풮∗(푀, 푐, 휖) has the shortest length.
The reason for this is that, in the asymptotic case, the length of the non-
concatenated versions are Ω(푀), because they must generate 푀 column
types, one for each user.
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Figure 3.4: Shortest Boneh-Shaw codes
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Next, we compare the Boneh-Shaw codes with binary 푐-SFP codes. To
make this comparison, we require the same error probability for the Boneh-
Shaw codes than that of the SFP codes, which is 휖 = 1 − 1/푐. The results
are shown in ﬁgure 3.5. Since the length of SFP codes depends on a factor
of the form 22푐, it is disadvantageous to use them for large values of 푐. The




















Figure 3.5: Boneh-Shaw codes versus SFP codes
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In ﬁgure 3.6 we include in the simulation the Tardos codes. As we have
commented previously, Tardos codes achieve the asymptotic bound for ﬁn-
gerprinting codes, and hence, it is not surprising that the greatest region is

















T (M, c, ǫ)
Figure 3.6: Boneh-Shaw codes versus SFP and Tardos codes
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The next simulation deals with 2-secure codes. In this case, only simplex,
풮(푘), and polynomial concatenated simplex codes ℱ풮(푛표, 푘푖) are, by far, the
ones with the minimum length for the purposed practical scenarios, even
shorter than the Tardos code. For instance, the code ℱ풮(32, 5) has length
푛 = 992 and can allocate up to푀 = 1.0995⋅1012 users with 휖 = 1.0421⋅10−66.
A tardos code with the same parameters has length 푛 = 71863. The sharp
boundaries in the graphic are justiﬁed because the codes 풮(푘) and ℱ풮(푛표, 푘푖)



















Figure 3.7: Comparison of codes for the case 푐 = 2
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Our next simulations deals with the quantiﬁcation of the number of
traitors (parameter 푐). Obviously, as 푀 grows, the number of traitors also
grows. However it is too pessimistic to consider that 푐 grows linearly with
푀 . Some authors propose 푐 = log(푀) [13]. We propose to determine 푐 as
푀푎, with 0 < 푎 ≤ 1. In the following simulations, we show how the length


















T (M, c, ǫ)BRS(M, c, ǫ)
Figure 3.8: Comparison of codes for the case 푐 = 푀푎
In ﬁgure 3.8 the Tardos almost covers the whole area. Only small strips
are reserved for the Boneh-Shaw and Barg codes for small number of users.
This simulation has been made with 푎 = 0.5, however, little changes are
appreciated irrespectively of the value of 푎. In the following simulations, we
omit the Tardos code.
In ﬁgures 3.9 and 3.10 it can be appreciated how the areas for the minimum-
length code change. Recall that the inner codes used in the Barg codes have
a length that grows with 22푐. That is the reason why the Barg codes are
only signiﬁcative for small values of 훼. As 훼 grows, and hence, 푐→푀 codes
designed speciﬁcally to ﬁght against size-푀 becomes relevant. However, note
that, even for values of 푎 of the order of 0.95 they are only useful for푀 ≤ 106
users, approximately.


















































































(d) 푎 = 0.50
Figure 3.9: Comparison of codes for the case 푐 =푀푎
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BS(M, c, ǫ)BS(M, ǫ)
(d) 푎 = 0.95
Figure 3.10: Comparison of codes for the case 푐 =푀푎
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Next, we present a comparison between codes with eﬃcient-decoding algo-
rithms. It is a fact that randomized codes are usually better than structured
codes. This has an enormous drawback, since the decoding of a random
code it is known to be an NP-hard problem. The simulation has been made
for the Reed-Solomon versions of the Barg and the structured concatenation
of Boneh-Shaw codes. Observe how the concatenated codes follow approxi-
mately the shape of the regions in ﬁgure 3.6, which are, actually, the shape
of their inner codes.
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Figure 3.11: Comparison of codes with eﬃcient-decoding algorithm.
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Finally, we present some ﬁgures for some parameters of the codes, where





ℬ풮(푀, 휖) 7.9674 ⋅ 1022
ℬ풮(푀, 푐, 휖) 3.9198 ⋅ 1013
ℬ풮★(푀, 푐, 휖) 4.9079 ⋅ 1012
풯 (푀, 푐, 휖) 3.9143 ⋅ 107
ℬRS(푀, 푐, 휖) ∞
ℬRS(푀, 푐, 휖) ∞
풞ℱRS(푀, 푐, 휖) 6.4526 ⋅ 1014





ℬ풮(푀, 휖) 8.4279 ⋅ 1025
ℬ풮(푀, 푐, 휖) 4.2905 ⋅ 1013
ℬ풮★(푀, 푐, 휖) 3.9033 ⋅ 1010
풯 (푀, 푐, 휖) 3.7301 ⋅ 107
ℬRS(푀, 푐, 휖) ∞
ℬRS(푀, 푐, 휖) ∞
풞ℱRS(푀, 푐, 휖) 1.0618 ⋅ 1012
Table 3.2: Lengths for 푀 = 108, 푐 = 30, 휖 = 10−10
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Code Length
풮(푘) 5.2700 ⋅ 102
ℱ풮(푛표, 푘푖) 3.7800 ⋅ 102
푐-SFP n/a
ℬ풮(푀, 휖) 2.9190 ⋅ 1010
ℬ풮(푀, 푐, 휖) 4.7231 ⋅ 105
ℬ풮★(푀, 푐, 휖) 1.565 ⋅ 104
풯 (푀, 푐, 휖) 3.7301 ⋅ 107
ℬRS(푀, 푐, 휖) 1.759 ⋅ 103
ℬRS(푀, 푐, 휖) 1.6924 ⋅ 103
풞ℱRS(푀, 푐, 휖) 8.8805 ⋅ 105




푐-SFP 7.7391 ⋅ 104
ℬ풮(푀, 휖) 3.4069 ⋅ 1022
ℬ풮(푀, 푐, 휖) 6.9500 ⋅ 1010
ℬ풮★(푀, 푐, 휖) 2.7749 ⋅ 106
풯 (푀, 푐, 휖) 4.0854 ⋅ 104
ℬRS(푀, 푐, 휖) 1.4891 ⋅ 106
ℬRS(푀, 푐, 휖) 1.4414 ⋅ 106
풞ℱRS(푀, 푐, 휖) 3.9320 ⋅ 107
Table 3.4: Lengths for 푀 = 107, 푐 = 5, 휖 = 1− 1/5
4The traceability properties of
Reed-Solomon codes
As we have seen, traceable codes play a paramount role in the ﬁngerprint-
ing framework. Ideally, one would like to use TA codes since they can be
decoded eﬃciently by means, for example, of a traditional half-distance de-
coder. Unfortunately, they are usually very long codes and require a very
stringent conditions to be constructed. One may try to relax the TA condi-
tion without losing the traceability properties using IPP codes. This topic
has received considerable attention in the recent years having been studied
by several authors.
Given a family of codes, we are interested in how much can the TA
property be relaxed without losing the IPP property. Speciﬁcally, in this
section we are concerned with the case of Reed-Solomon codes. We try to
give an answer to the question raised by Silverberg et al. in [22, 9]: Is it
the case that all IPP Reed-Solomon codes are TA?. We show how often,
losing the TA property implies losing more basic properties than just the
IPP property.
4.1 SFP, IPP and TA codes
Recall from section 2.2 that, under the narrow-sense envelope model, a code 풞
has the 푐-TA property if, for any pirate ﬁngerprint generated by a 푐-coalition
퐶 ⊆ 풞, the closest codeword of 풞, in terms of the Hamming distance, is a
traitor.
Recall the deﬁnition of group separation (deﬁnition 2.1.1):
D(퐴,퐵) = ∣U(퐴,퐵)∣,
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where U(퐴,퐵) = {푖 : {푎1,푖, 푎2,푖, . . . } ∩ {푏1,푖, 푏2,푖, . . . } = ∅} is the set of sep-
arated coordinates. Recall also that we deﬁne the (푐1, 푐2)-group separation
of a code 풞, 퐷푐1,푐2, as the minimum 퐷(퐴,퐵) for disjoint sets 퐴,퐵 ⊆ 풞 with
∣퐴∣ = 푐1 and ∣퐵∣ = 푐2. For linear codes, we have the following result.
Proposition 4.1.1. For any [푛, 푘, 푑]푞-code 풞 and any pair of positive integer
values 푐1, 푐2 it holds that
max{0, 푑−(푐1푐2−1)(푛−푑)} ≤ 퐷푐1,푐2 ≤ max{0, 푑−(푐1+푐2−2)(푘−1)}. (4.1)
Proof. To prove the ﬁrst inequality, let us compute the maximum number
of nonseparated coordinates that any pair of disjoint sets, 퐴,퐵 ⊆ 풞, could
have. Without loss of generality, assume that ∣퐴∣ = 푐1 and ∣퐵∣ = 푐2, and
let us call 푥 the required number. First, note that the maximum similitude
between any two codewords of 풞 is 푛 − 푑. Therefore, every codeword in
퐴 contributes, at most, with 푐2(푛 − 푑) nonseparated coordinates, assuming
that it agrees with every codeword in 퐵 in 푛− 푑 coordinates. As we have 푐1
codewords in 퐴,
푛−퐷푐1,푐2 = 푥 ≤ min{푛, 푐1푐2(푛− 푑)}
proves the inequality.
To prove the second inequality, let us construct explicitly two disjoint sets
퐴,퐵 ⊆ 풞 in the following way. We call 푦 the number of nondisjoint coordi-
nates in this case. First choose two codewords a1,b1 ∈ 풞 which agree exactly
in 푛−푑 coordinates. Such codewords exist by deﬁnition of the minimum dis-
tance. Insert a1 into 퐴 and b1 into 퐵. For the 푑 remaining coordinates
were a1 and b1 do not agree, we operate in the following way. As 풞 is a 푘-
dimensional vector space, one can always ﬁnd a codeword that matches any
other codeword in any set of, at least, 푘 − 1 arbitrary coordinates.1 Choose
푐1 − 1 codewords such that each one of them matches 푘 − 1 disjoint posi-
tions with b1 (in the 푑 coordinates where a1 and b1 are diﬀerent) and insert
them into 퐴. Proceed similarly for the codeword a1 and insert the computed
codewords into 퐵. Therefore, we have that
푛−퐷푐1,푐2 = 푦 ≥ min{푛, (푛− 푑) + (푐1 + 푐2 − 2)(푘 − 1)},
which proves the inequality.
Note that if we set either 푐1 = 1 or 푐2 = 1 in (4.1) we obtain the well-
known result 푛− 푑 ≥ 푘 − 1, which is the Singleton bound for linear codes.
1We omit this part of the proof.
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From the previous result it follows that for a linear [푛, 푘, 푑]-code, if 푑 >
(푐1푐2 − 1)(푛− 푑) the code is (푐1, 푐2)-SFP, and if 푑 ≤ (푐1 + 푐2 − 2)(푘 − 1) the
code is not (푐1, 푐2)-SFP. Regarding the 푐-TA property we have the following
suﬃcient condition.
Proposition 4.1.2. An (푛,푀, 푑)-code 풞 is 푐-TA if
퐷1,푐 > (1− 1/푐)푛. (4.2)
Proof. From the deﬁnition of 퐷1,푐, there exists a 푐-coalition 퐶 ⊆ 풞 that can
generate a pirate codeword x such that d(x,u) = 퐷1,푐 for some u ∈ 풞 ∖ 퐶,
and it does not exist any u′ ∈ 풞 ∖ 퐶 such that d(x,u′) < 퐷1,푐. Note that x
must agree with some traitor t ∈ 퐶 at least in 푛/푐 coordinates. Therefore,
d(x, t) ≤ (1− 1/푐)푛 < 퐷1,푐 ≤ d(x,u) for all u ∈ 풞 ∖ 퐶.
It is not diﬃcult to see that
푑 > (1− 1/푐2)푛 (4.3)
implies the previous condition, and therefore the code is 푐-TA too. The
converse is, in general, not true.
Example 4.1.3. Consider the following two codes over 픽4 = {0, 1, 훼, 훼2}:
풞 = {(0, 0), (1, 1), (훼, 훼), (훼2, 훼2)}
풞′ = {(0, 0, 0), (1, 1, 0), (훼, 훼, 0), (훼2, 훼2, 0)}
Observe that, for 푐 = 2, 풞 satisﬁes both (4.2) and (4.3), whereas 풞′ only
satisﬁes (4.2). Nevertheless, they both are 2-TA codes. For 푐 = 3, 풞′ does
not satisfy neither (4.2) nor (4.3), even though it is a 3-TA code.
If 푑 can be easily computed, it is often an easy way to determine or
construct 푐-TA codes rather than computing the value 퐷1,푐. We can now
expand the diagram of equation (2.1) as follows:
푑 > (1− 1/푐2)푛⇒ 퐷1,푐 > (1− 1/푐)푛⇒ 푐-TA⇒ 푐-IPP⇒ (푐, 푐)-SFP (4.4)
Codes that meet the Singleton bound, 푀 ≤ 푞푛−푑+1, are called maximum
distance separable (MDS) codes. Linear MDS codes satisfy that 푛−푑 = 푘−1
and conditions (4.2) and (4.3) are equivalent for them [23]. What is more,
the following result also holds.
Theorem 4.1.4 ([23]). Let 풞 be an [푛, 푘, 푑]푞-code with 푛 ≤ 푞+1. Then, for
푐 ≥ 2, 풞 has the 푐-TA property if and only if 푑 > (1− 1/푐2)푛.
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Reed-Solomon codes are an important family of linear MDS codes which
are also cyclic. We denote by t(푖) the cyclic rotation in 푖 coordinates to
the right of t ∈ 픽푛푞 . In [22, 9] authors raised the question wether it is
the case that all 푐-IPP Reed-Solomon codes are 푐-TA codes. Even though
the conditions that appear on the right in (4.4) are more stringent than
those on the left, for a large family of Reed-Solomon codes it turns out that
(푐, 푐)-SFP ⇔ 푑 > (1 − 1/푐2)푛. In the next section we present a method to
ﬁnd nonseparated conﬁgurations when the code is not 푐-TA and 푐 divides
the ﬁeld size.
We describe here one last convention that we will use henceforth. Let 푓
be a polynomial 푓 ∈ 픽푞[푥]. We can deﬁne the map 푓 : 픽푞 → 픽푞 as 푥 7→ 푓(푥).
We shall immediately become less formal and refer to this map simply as
the polynomial 푓 . We will be specially interested in polynomials 푓 such that
푓 : 픽푞 → 픽푞 is homomorphic.
4.2 Equivalence of the traceability properties
of Reed-Solomon codes
The main result of this section comes in the form of the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2.1. Letℛ풮푞(푘) be a Reed-Solomon code over 픽푞 and 푐 a divisor
of 푞. Then, if the minimum distance of ℛ풮푞(푘) satisﬁes 푑 ≤ 푛 − 푛/푐2 the
code is not (푐, 푐)-SFP.
The proof of the theorem can get somewhat lost in the notation and
the construction of the elements that appear in it. Because of this, we ﬁrst
present aprocedure which summarizes the idea underneath the construction
of the elements in the proof.
Let ℛ풮푞(푘), 푐 and 푑 be as stated in theorem 4.2.1. Note that in this
situation ℛ풮푞(푘) is not 푐-TA. Our goal is to ﬁnd a pair of subsets of size at
most 푐, 퐶1, 퐶2 ⊆ ℛ풮푞(푘), such that D(퐶1, 퐶2) = 0. That would prove that
ℛ풮푞(푘) fails to be (푐, 푐)-SFP too.
Given the ﬁnite ﬁeld 픽푞, an integer value 푐 satisfying 푐∣푞, and a Reed-
Solomon code over 픽푞, ℛ풮푞(푘), with minimum distance 푑 ≤ (1− 1/푐2)푛, the
following procedure outputs a pair of subsets 푇1, 푇2 ⊆ ℛ풮푞(푘) such that they
are (푐, 푐)-nonseparated:
1. If 푐2 > 푞 then:
(a) Set 푐′ = min{푐, 푛}.
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(b) Find a codeword t = (푡1, . . . , 푡푛) ∈ ℛ풮푞(푘) such that ∣픗∣ = 푐′,
where 픗 = {푡1, . . . , 푡푐′}.
(c) Return
푇1 = {푡1 : 푡 ∈ 픗} and
푇2 = {t(푖푐′) : 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ ⌈푛/푐′⌉}.
2. Else (푐2 ≤ 푞):
(a) Find an additive subgroup 퐺 ≤ 픽푞 with 푞/푐2 elements.
(b) Find a nontrivial minimum-degree polynomial 푓 ∈ 픽푞[푥] with the
elements of퐺 as single-multiplicity roots (the application 푓 : 픽푞 →
픽푞 will act as an additive homomorphism with ker 푓 = 퐺).
(c) Find a subgroup 푆 ≤ im 푓 of 푐 elements and its 푐 cosets, 훽1 +
푆, . . . , 훽푐 + 푆. Set 픅 = {훽1, . . . , 훽푐}.
(d) Set 푟 = random{1, . . . , 푐} and consider the coset 훽푟 + 푆.
(e) Return
푇1 = {훽푗1 : 훽푗 ∈ 훽푟 + 푆} and
푇2 = {ev(푓(푥)− 훽푖) : 훽푖 ∈ 픅}.
Note that the procedure, as well as the proof of theorem 4.2.1, is split in
two cases. The ﬁrst case is proved in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2.2. Let ℛ풮푞(푘) be a Reed-Solomon code over 픽푞 and 푐 an
integer satisfying 푐2 ≥ 푞 − 1. Then, if the minimum distance of ℛ풮푞(푘)
satisﬁes 푑 ≤ 푛− 푛/푐2 the code is not (푐, 푐)-SFP.
Proof. According to the stated restrictions, we have that 푛 = 푞 − 1 and
푘 ≥ 2. This means that ℛ풮푞(2) ⊆ ℛ풮푞(푘), i.e. ℛ풮푞(푘) contains all the
codewords resulting from the evaluation of constant and linear polynomials.
Take a nontrivial linear polynomial and its associated codeword, t. Take
the ﬁrst 푐′ = min{푐, 푛} coordinates of t, {푡1, . . . , 푡푐′}, which are all diﬀerent,
and construct 퐶1 and 퐶2 as in step 1c of the procedure. Note that ∣퐶2∣ =
⌈푛/푐′⌉ ≤ ∣퐶1∣ = 푐′ ≤ 푐. One can easily check that for the coordinates
with indexes (푖 − 1)푐′ + 1, . . . , 푖푐′ the codeword t(푖푐′) ∈ 퐶2 takes values in
픗, for 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ ⌈푛/푐′⌉. Because ⌈푛/푐′⌉ ≥ 푛, for each coordinate there exist
some codeword in 퐶2 which takes a value in 픗 and, therefore, agrees in that
coordinate with some codeword in 퐶1. Hence, D(퐶1, 퐶2) = 0, which implies
that ℛ풮푞(푘) is not (푐, 푐)-SFP.
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To prove the second case, we need the following supporting lemmas.
Lemma 4.2.3. Let 푅 be an additive subgroup of 푟 elements of the ﬁnite
ﬁeld 픽푞, 푅 ≤ 픽푞. Then, if 푚 divides 푟 there exists a subgroup 푆 ≤ 푅 with
푚 elements.
Proof. The Sylow theorems [24] guarantee the existence of 푆. We show a
constructive way to ﬁnd 푆 which works for the case of ﬁnite ﬁelds. Since
푅 ≤ 픽푞, 푟 must divide 푞. Let us convey 푞 = 푝푘, 푟 = 푝푗 and 푚 = 푝푖, for some
prime number 푝 and some positive integers 푘 ≥ 푗 ≥ 푖, and let us call 푆푖 the
subgroup with 푝푖 elements. The construction is by induction on 푖. For 푖 = 0
simply take 푆0 = {0}. For 0 < 푖 ≤ 푗 take ﬁrst any subgroup 푆푖−1 ≤ 푅 with











where 훽 ∈ 푅∖푆푖−1. Using the fact that
∑푝
푙=1 훽 = 0, it is routine to check that
푆푖 is an additive subgroup with 푝
푖 elements. Note that, in general, neither
푅 nor 푆 need not be isomorphic to 픽푟 and 픽푚, respectively.
Lemma 4.2.4. Given the ﬁnite ﬁeld 픽푞 and a divisor of 푞, 푚, there exists
a nontrivial polynomial 푓 ∈ 픽푞[푥] of degree 푚 such that the application
푓 : 픽푞 → 픽푞 is an additive homomorphism.
Proof. By lemma 4.2.3, take 푅 = 픽푞 and a subgroup 퐺 ≤ 푅 of 푚 elements,





(푥− 푔푖), 휌 ∈ 픽∗푞 .
Note that the polynomial 푓(푥) vanishes in all the elements of the subgroup
퐺 and the polynomial 푓훽(푥) = 푓(푥)− 푓(훽) vanishes in the coset 훽+퐺. This












(푥− 푔푖) = −휌
푚∏
푖=1
(푥− 푔푖) = −푓(푥).
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Note that the fourth equality is true for 푚 odd. This is the case of any ﬁeld
of characteristic ∕= 2. For ﬁelds of characteristic 2 we have that −1 = 1, and
the equality holds too. Finally,
푓(푥+ 푦) = 휌
푚∏
푖=1
(푥+ 푦 − 푔푖) = 휌
푚∏
푖=1




(푥− (−푦 − 푔푖)) = 푓−푦(푥) = 푓(푥) + 푓(푦)
proves that 푓 : 픽푞 → 픽푞 it is an additive homomorphism. Note that ker 푓 = 퐺
and ∣ im 푓 ∣ = ∣픽푞/퐺∣.
Now, we are in position to prove the main result of this section.
Proof of Theorem 4.2.1. We prove the theorem by explicitly ﬁnding, again,
a pair of subsets which form (푐, 푐)-nonseparated conﬁguration.
If 푐2 > 푞, the code is not (푐, 푐)-SFP by proposition 4.2.2. From now
on, we assume that 푐2 ≤ 푞. Under this circumstance, if 푐 divides 푞, so 푐2
does. Therefore, as ℛ풮푞(푞/푐2 + 1) ⊆ ℛ풮푞(푘), it suﬃces to consider the case
푘 = 푞/푐2 + 1. Lemma 4.2.4 provides a constructive proof of the existence of
a nontrivial polynomial 푓 of degree 푞/푐2 such that 푓 : 픽푞 → 픽푞 acts as an
additive homomorphism. Hence ev(푓) ∈ ℛ풮푞(푘). Since ∣ ker 푓 ∣ = 푞/푐2, then
∣ im 푓 ∣ = 푐2. Take a subgroup of 푐 elements 푆 ≤ im 푓 . This can be done
because im 푓 ≤ 픽푞 and lemma 4.2.3 guarantees the existence of 푆. Now,
construct 픅, 훽푟 + 푆, 퐶1 and 퐶2 as in steps 2c, 2d and 2e of the procedure.
Note that ∣퐶1∣ = ∣퐶2∣ = 푐. Note also that for every 훾 ∈ 픽푞 there exists a
polynomial 푓푖 ∈ 퐶2 such that
푓푖(훾) ∈ 훽푟 + 푆. (4.5)
This is true because the 푐 polynomials of 퐶2 replicate the 푐 cosets of 푆 in
disjoint subsets of 픽푞 due to the fact that the cosets of im 푓 are disjoint. For
example consider the subgroup 푆 itself (assuming that 훽1 ∈ 푆 and 푟 = 1,
i.e. 훽푟 + 푆 = 0 + 푆). It is replicated in the coset 훽2 + 푆 in the polynomial
푓(푥) − 훽2, which is disjoint from 푆, in the coset 훽3 + 푆 in the polynomial
푓(푥)− 훽3, which is disjoint from 푆 and 훽2 + 푆, etc. An analogous argument
can be applied to any coset of 푆. Because of (4.5) and since 퐶1 contains the
constant-valued codewords in 훽푟 + 푆, an arbitrary coset, D(퐶1, 퐶2) = 0 and
the Reed-Solomon code ℛ풮푞(푘) is not (푐, 푐)-SFP.
Finally, note that in the second construction we have not exploded the
cyclic nature of the Reed-Solomon codes. This, together with (4.5) makes
that construction be valid even for extended Reed-Solomon codes (i.e. Reed-
Solomon codes where the evaluation point 0 is also considered and 푛 = 푞).
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4.3 Example
Consider the ﬁeld 픽27 = 픽3[푥]/(푥
3 + 2푥 + 1) with primitive element 훼 = 푥.
Consider the case 푐 = 3 and take the Reed-Solomon code ℛ풮27(4). First, we
take the subgroup 푆 = {0, 1, 훼13} and construct the polynomial
푓(푥) = 휌(푥− 0)(푥− 1)(푥− 훼13) = 휌(푥3 + 훼13푥), 휌 ∈ 픽∗푞.
For simplicity we choose 휌 = 1. The associated codeword to 푓 is
ev(푓) = (0, 훼13, 훼9, 훼13, 훼3, 훼16, 훼, 훼3, 훼22, 훼13, 훼, 훼,
훼9, 0, 1, 훼22, 1, 훼16, 훼3, 훼14, 훼16, 훼9, 1, 훼14, 훼14, 훼22),
where it can be read oﬀ that im 푓 = {0, 1, 훼, 훼3, 훼9, 훼13, 훼14, 훼16, 훼22}.
Since 푐2 = ∣ im 푓 ∣, we take, for example the subgroup 푆 = {0, 1, 훼13} ≤ im 푓
of 푐 elements and its 푐 cosets:
푆1 = 훽1 + 푆 = {0, 1, 훼13}
푆2 = 훽2 + 푆 = {훼, 훼3, 훼9}
푆3 = 훽3 + 푆 = {훼14, 훼16, 훼22},
where 훽1 = 0, 훽2 = 훼 and 훽3 = 훼
14. Now consider the polynomials 푓푖(푥) =
푓(푥)− 훽푖, for 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푐. Their evaluations are those depicted in (4.6), where
each coset 푆푖 has been colored in the same way in every codeword. It can
be seen that the three codewords cover disjoint positions in each coordinate
for every coset. Hence, they can generate a common descendant with any
of the sets whose elements are the constant words having as coordinates the
elements of every coset. Valid 퐶1 sets are those corresponding to constant
codewords in 푆1, 푆2 and 푆3, as depicted in (4.7), (4.8) and (4.9), respectively.
The common descendants are, precisely, those whose coordinates belong to
the same coset 푆푖 and are colored (underlined) in the same way.
4.4 Results for other coalition sizes
In [25] it was presented a related result proving the equivalence of SFP and
TA for another families of Reed-Solomon codes. The idea there was to restate
the SFP condition algebraically, as a system of equations.
Theorem 4.4.1 ([25]). Let ℛ풮푞(푘) be a Reed-Solomon code over 픽푞 such
that 푘 − 1 divides 푞 − 1. Then, if 푑 ≤ 푛− 푛/푐2 the code is not (푐, 푐)-SFP.



















(0 , 훼13, 훼9 , 훼13, 훼3 , 훼16, 훼 , 훼3 , 훼22, 훼13, 훼 , 훼 , 훼9 , 0 , 1 , 훼22, 1 , 훼16, 훼3 , 훼14, 훼16, 훼9 , 1 , 훼14, 훼14, 훼22)
(훼14, 훼22, 1 , 훼22, 훼13, 훼9 , 0 , 훼13, 훼3 , 훼22, 0 , 0 , 1 , 훼14, 훼16, 훼3 , 훼16, 훼9 , 훼13, 훼 , 훼9 , 1 , 훼16, 훼 , 훼 , 훼3 )
(훼 , 훼3 , 훼16, 훼3 , 훼22, 1 , 훼14, 훼22, 훼13, 훼3 , 훼14, 훼14, 훼16, 훼 , 훼9 , 훼13, 훼9 , 1 , 훼22, 0 , 1 , 훼16, 훼9 , 0 , 0 , 훼13)
(4.6)
(0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 )
(1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 )
(훼13, 훼13, 훼13, 훼13, 훼13, 훼13, 훼13, 훼13, 훼13, 훼13, 훼13, 훼13, 훼13, 훼13, 훼13, 훼13, 훼13, 훼13, 훼13, 훼13, 훼13, 훼13, 훼13, 훼13, 훼13, 훼13)
(4.7)
(훼 , 훼 , 훼 , 훼 , 훼 , 훼 , 훼 , 훼 , 훼 , 훼 , 훼 , 훼 , 훼 , 훼 , 훼 , 훼 , 훼 , 훼 , 훼 , 훼 , 훼 , 훼 , 훼 , 훼 , 훼 , 훼 )
(훼3 , 훼3 , 훼3 , 훼3 , 훼3 , 훼3 , 훼3 , 훼3 , 훼3 , 훼3 , 훼3 , 훼3 , 훼3 , 훼3 , 훼3 , 훼3 , 훼3 , 훼3 , 훼3 , 훼3 , 훼3 , 훼3 , 훼3 , 훼3 , 훼3 , 훼3 )
(훼9 , 훼9 , 훼9 , 훼9 , 훼9 , 훼9 , 훼9 , 훼9 , 훼9 , 훼9 , 훼9 , 훼9 , 훼9 , 훼9 , 훼9 , 훼9 , 훼9 , 훼9 , 훼9 , 훼9 , 훼9 , 훼9 , 훼9 , 훼9 , 훼9 , 훼9 )
(4.8)
(훼14, 훼14, 훼14, 훼14, 훼14, 훼14, 훼14, 훼14, 훼14, 훼14, 훼14, 훼14, 훼14, 훼14, 훼14, 훼14, 훼14, 훼14, 훼14, 훼14, 훼14, 훼14, 훼14, 훼14, 훼14, 훼14)
(훼16, 훼16, 훼16, 훼16, 훼16, 훼16, 훼16, 훼16, 훼16, 훼16, 훼16, 훼16, 훼16, 훼16, 훼16, 훼16, 훼16, 훼16, 훼16, 훼16, 훼16, 훼16, 훼16, 훼16, 훼16, 훼16)
(훼22, 훼22, 훼22, 훼22, 훼22, 훼22, 훼22, 훼22, 훼22, 훼22, 훼22, 훼22, 훼22, 훼22, 훼22, 훼22, 훼22, 훼22, 훼22, 훼22, 훼22, 훼22, 훼22, 훼22, 훼22, 훼22)
(4.9)
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Proposition 4.4.2. Given a Reed-Solomon code ℛ풮푞(푘) over 픽푞 with min-
imum distance 푑 and an integer value 푐, if either 푐∣푞 or (푘 − 1)∣(푞 − 1) then,
ℛ풮푞(푘) satisﬁes
푑 > (1− 1/푐2)푛⇔ 푐-TA⇔ 푐-IPP⇔ (푐, 푐)-SFP.
In fact, the construction presented in the step 2 in the procedure deﬁned
in section 4.2 can be easily generalized for any integer 푐 and (extended)
Reed-Solomon code over 픽푞 satisfying the following property.
Proposition 4.4.3. Let ℛ풮푞(푘) be a Reed-Solomon code over 픽푞 and 푐 an




Then, if the minimum distance of ℛ풮푞(푘) satisﬁes 푑 ≤ 푛− 푛/푐2 the code is
not (푐, 푐)-SFP.
Proof. Let us call 푐¯ the value of equation (4.10). It implies that 푐¯ divides
푞. Then, by theorem 4.2.1, if ℛ풮푞(푘) had 푑 ≤ 푛 − 푛/푐¯2 the code would
not be (푐¯, 푐¯)-SFP. But note that 푐¯ ≤ 푐, hence 푑 ≤ 푛 − 푛/푐2 ≤ 푛 − 푛/푐¯2, so
the code is not (푐¯, 푐¯)-SFP and, obviously, not (푐, 푐)-SFP. In other words, it
exists a ℛ풮 ′푞(푘′) ⊆ ℛ풮푞(푘) such that the conditions of theorem 4.2.1 hold
for a smaller value than 푐. The case of extended Reed-Solomon codes follows
easily from this result.
Illustratively, in table 4.1 we show some families of Reed-Solomon codes
for certain values of 푐 and 푞 which obey (푐, 푐)-SFP ⇔ 푐-TA with 푘 = ⌈(푞 −


















Table 4.1: Some families of covered Reed-Solomon codes
ℛ풮푞(푘 = ⌈(푞− 1)/푐2+ 1⌉): (a) codes that satisfy 푐2 > 푞, (b) codes that
satisfy (4.10), (c) codes that satisfy (푘 − 1)∣(푞 − 1)
픽푞 64 81 125 128 243 256 512 625 729 1024 2187
푐 = 2 (b) (c) (c) (b) – (b) (b) (c) (c) (b) –
3 (c) (b) – – (b) – – – (b) – (b)
4 (b) (c) – (b) – (b) (b) (c) – (b) –
5 (c) (c) (b) – – – – (b) – – –
8 (b) (c) (c) (b) – (b) (b) – – (b) –
9 (a) (b) (c) (b) (b) (b) (c) (c) (b) – (b)
10 (a) (a) (c) (b) (b) (c) – – (c) (c) –
11 (a) (a) (c) (b) (b) (c) – (c) (c) – –
14-15 (a) (a) (a) (a) (c) – – (c) (c) – –
16 (a) (a) (a) (a) (a) (b) (b) (c) – (b) –
17-18 (a) (a) (a) (a) (a) (a) (b) (c) – (b) –
픽푞 512 625 729 1024 2187
푐 = 19 (b) (c) – (c) –
20-22 (b) (c) (c) (c) –
23-24 (a) (c) (c) – –
25 (a) (b) (c) – –
26 (a) (a) (c) – –
27 (a) (a) (b) – (b)
28-31 (a) (a) (a) – (b)
32 (a) (a) (a) (b) (b)
33 (a) (a) (a) (a) (b)
34-46 (a) (a) (a) (a) (c)
≥ 47 (a) (a) (a) (a) (a)
5Conclusion
In this project we have presented an study of the properties of the main
ﬁngerprinting codes, mainly focused on the determination of their length.
We have also proposed methods to determine an estimation of this value
when there is no direct method to obtain it. Speciﬁcally, we have presented
and discussed some results related to SFP, Boneh-Shaw and Barg codes, and
the codes presented in [2].
Also, we have presented a comparative analysis of the families of codes
introduced in the project. The results show the regions where it is preferable
to use each code, given the design parameters of number of users to allocate,
maximum size of the collusions and identiﬁcation error probability.
Finally, we have discussed the tracing properties of Reed-Solomon codes.
Our main goal was to give an answer to the question posted by Silverberg
et al. in [22, 9] (Is it the case that all IPP Reed-Solomon codes are TA? ).
We have proven the equivalence of the SFP, IPP and TA properties for some
families of Reed-Solomon codes, where the coalition of traitors has the par-
ticularity that its size divides the ﬁeld size. Obviously this does not provide
a full answer to the question but hopefully it gives some hints that may be
useful in ﬁnding the ﬁnal response.
5.1 Future work
The main open questions are:
1. Determining a practical method to estimate the length of the 풞ℱAG(푀, 푐, 휖)
code.
2. Determining the limits of concatenation for ﬁngerprinting code: when
is it detrimental to concatenate in terms of code length?
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3. Providing a full answer to the question about the properties of Reed-
Solomon codes.
Of course, it would be interesting to determine if the last question also applies
to other families of MDS or non-MDS codes.
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